This paper uses the segmented dual-class shares of Chinese firms-A-shares traded inside mainland China by local investors and H shares traded in Hong Kong by foreign investors-to compare reactions of local and foreign investors to recommendations made by local and foreign analysts. We find a rich set of differential reactions, and, in particular, the differential reactions of A-share prices to recommendations made by local and foreign analysts are greater than the differential reactions of H-share prices. These findings support the notion that social connections between investors and analysts can cause differential investor reactions to analyst recommendations.
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A growing strand of finance literature argues that investors may agree to disagree about the precision of certain public information and thus react differently. Building on this premise, the literature, e.g., Harris and Raviv (1993) , Kandel and Pearson (1995) , Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) , Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), Cao and Ou-yang (2009) , and Dumas, Lewis, and Osambela (2011) , has developed a series of models to explain a host of asset market phenomena, such as speculative bubbles, excessive trading, excessive asset price volatility, and volatile international equity flow. Hong Kong officially returned to China in 1997 from British colonization, it has an autonomous government and a financial system independent of the mainland's. China's capital controls prevent capital from freely moving between the mainland and outside (including Hong Kong). The capital controls result in segmentation of A and H shares and make the SEHK a hub for investment in Chinese stocks by foreign investors.
We refer to A-share investors, who are primarily residents of the mainland, as "local" and Hshare investors, who are a mix of investors from Hong Kong and other parts of the world, as "foreign." As the A and H shares have the same cash flow and voting rights, their prices separately reflect beliefs and preferences of the local and foreign investors. These dually listed shares are also covered by financial analysts of brokerage houses inside and outside mainland China, which we call local and foreign houses, respectively. By comparing reactions of A-share and H-share prices to recommendation changes made by analysts of local and foreign houses, we examine several mechanisms that affect information processing of local and foreign investors.
We are particularly interested in examining how social connections between investors and analysts can affect investor reactions to analyst recommendations. Such an effect can occur 1 See Hong and Stein (2007) and Xiong (2012) for more detailed reviews of this literature. through several closely related channels. First, by having closer social and cultural connections to local analysts, local investors may trust recommendations made by local analysts more than those made by foreign analysts, e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009), Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) , and Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2013) ; similarly, H-share investors may have greater trust in recommendations made by foreign analysts. Second, local (foreign) analysts may have an advantage in catering to local (foreign) investors by better relating their reports to particular concerns and excitement of local (foreign) investors, e.g., Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) . Third, limited attention may cause local (foreign) investors to pay more attention to information provided by the more trustworthy local (foreign) analysts, e.g., Sims (2003) , Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) , Peng and Xiong (2006) , and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) . These intermingled mechanisms can work together and jointly lead to a social connection effect-local investors regard information provided by local analysts as more reliable than it actually is, while foreign investors regard information by foreign analysts as more reliable than it is.
The following example illustrates the relevance of this social connection effect. In June 2011, American analysts from Muddy Waters Research and Citron Research released a series of reports on a number of Chinese firms, including the Sino Forest Corporation, which was listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange, and Harbin Electric, which was listed on NASDAQ, accusing them of accounting fraud. These reports led to not only large stock price crashes of the accused firms but also to substantial price declines of all Chinese stocks listed on NASDAQ-as much as 15% in June 2011. In sharp contrast to the dramatic reaction of NASDAQ investors, investors inside China hardly reacted to these reports, which were widely circulated by the financial news media inside China. Many Chinese investors believed that these overseas analysts were vicious and had exaggerated the cases against the Chinese firms. 2 As a result, the prices of stock traded inside China barely budged during this period. Lee, Li, and Zhang (2014) systematically examine the financial heath and performance of Chinese reverse merger firms on U.S. stock markets-the main targets of these allegations-between 2001 and 2010 and find that they tend to be more mature and less speculative than either their U.S. counterparts or a group of exchange-industry-size matched firms. As a group, Chinese reverse merger firms outperformed their matched peers from inception through the end of 2013, even after including most of the firms accused of accounting fraud.
We use an event-study approach to compare daily price reactions of the dually listed A and H shares to a large sample of recommendation changes made by analysts of local and foreign houses.
To guide our analysis, we also develop a theoretical framework, which incorporates not only the social connection effect, but also two additional effects previously emphasized by the literature.
First, local investors are better informed than foreign investors about home assets due to their superior private information, e.g., Gehrig (1993) and Brennan and Cao (1997) . Second, local analysts have better information quality than foreign analysts due to their lower information collection costs, e.g., Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) and Du, Yu, and Yu (2014) .
We specifically examine several predictions implied by the theoretical framework. First, the theoretical framework predicts that A-share investors react more strongly to recommendations made by local analysts than to those by foreign analysts, due to two joint effects: A-share investors having closer connections to local analysts than to foreign analysts and local analysts having better information than foreign analysts. Second, our framework also predicts that H-share investors react more strongly than A-share investors to recommendations made by foreign analysts, again due to two joint effects: H-share investors having closer connections than A-share investors to foreign analysts and H-share investors being less informed than A-share investors about Chinese firms.
We indeed find evidence consistent with these predictions: A-share prices have significantly stronger reactions to recommendation changes made by analysts of local houses than to those by analysts of foreign houses, and H-share prices have significantly stronger reactions than A-share prices to recommendation changes made by analysts of foreign houses. While these findings clearly demonstrate differential reactions of local and foreign investors, they are insufficient to establish the social connection effect due to the presence of the two alternative effects.
Finally, our framework also shows that a difference-in-difference analysis helps isolate the social connection effect. Specifically, it predicts that the differential reactions of A-share investors to recommendations made by local and foreign analysts are greater than the differential reactions of H-share investors. Indeed, we find significant evidence supporting the greater differential reactions of A-share prices in the data. To ensure the robustness of our findings, we use three different price reaction measures: 1) cumulative abnormal return; 2) cumulative abnormal return deflated by idiosyncratic return volatility; and 3) whether a recommendation change is influential, as suggested by Loh and Stulz (2011) . All three measures give consistent results throughout our analyses.
We also take advantage of two special subsamples of the data to further isolate potential effects caused by unobservable characteristics. First, a subset of the recommendation changes in our sample were paired with one for the A-share market and the other for the H-share market. As these paired recommendations were made by the same house for the same firm on the same date, they allow us to control for all firm specific and analyst specific characteristics, which may not be fully captured by the control variables used in our main analysis. Second, a set of foreign houses in our sample hired both Chinese and non-Chinese analysts to cover Chinese firms. By comparing price reactions of A and H shares to recommendations made by Chinese and non-Chinese analysts of the same foreign houses, we can further control for an argument that A-share and H-share investors having different access to reports of local and foreign houses.
Taken together, our analysis documents a set of patterns in the differential reactions of local and foreign investors to recommendations made by local and foreign analysts. These patterns cannot be fully explained by local investors being more informed than foreign investors or by local analysts having better information quality than foreign analysts. Instead, they support the presence of a social connection effect in driving differential reactions of local and foreign investors to recommendations made by local and foreign analysts.
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related literature in Section I and describe the institutional setting in Section II. Section III introduces the data sample, and Section IV presents the theoretical framework. Section V reports our main empirical results on differential reactions of A and H shares to analyst recommendations. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
I. Related Literature
Besides the aforementioned literature on heterogeneous beliefs in asset markets, our findings also add to the understanding of the heterogeneity between local and foreign investors, which is critical for understanding several central issues in international finance, such as home bias and the dynamics of international equity flow. Only a small fraction of these firms (106 out of the full set of 2489 firms) issued B shares, which were traded in foreign currency, specifically in U.S. dollars on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and in Hong Kong dollars on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Before February 2001, A shares were restricted to Chinese residents while B shares were restricted to foreign investors. After February 2001, the Chinese government relaxed the restriction on B shares by allowing Chinese residents with foreign currency to legally trade B shares, while maintaining the restriction on A shares. Also note that some firms had issued both A and B shares. See Mei, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2009) for a study of price differentials between A and B shares issued by these firms.
Interestingly, a set of firms issued both A and H shares. These dually listed shares compose the main sample of our analysis. A and H shares of these firms offered the same voting and cashflow rights. The three stock exchanges involved in listing these shares all required the firms to disclose identical information to investors, including those inside and outside mainland China.
During our sample period, China imposed stringent capital controls, which prevented local and foreign investors from freely moving capital across its borders. As a result, local investors could not simply move capital to Hong Kong to trade H shares; neither could foreign investors move capital to the mainland to trade A shares. As A shares were traded only in the mainland and H shares outside the mainland, the capital controls led to segmentation of the dually listed A and H shares, There were several exceptions to the capital controls. In 2002, China introduced a program called Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs), which allowed a select group of foreign institutions to invest in financial assets inside mainland China subject to quotas set by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). In 2011, China introduced RMB QFII, which mainly allowed Chinese firms collecting RMB outside China to invest in the mainland securities market. By the end of 2013, there were 251 QFIIs and 61 RQFIIs, with a total investment value of 49.7 billion U.S. dollars, and 157.5 billion RMB, respectively, which was minor relative to the market capitalization of China's securities markets. In 2007, China launched another program called Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (QDIIs), which allowed a group of domestic institutions to invest in securities outside mainland China, including stocks traded in Hong Kong, again subject to quotas set by the CSRC. By the end of 2013, there were 83 QDIIs, with a total net asset value of merely 58.8 billion RMB. After November 2014, the Chinese government further relaxed the capital controls as part of its effort to qualify RMB for the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) The prices of these paired A and H shares could substantially deviate from each other. Figure   1 plots the average price ratio of A shares to H shares, with the value weighted across all available pairs. The average price ratio mostly stayed in a range between 1 and 2 during the sample period.
This price deviation reflects the aforementioned segmentation of A and H markets. The literature, as referenced in Section I, has pointed out that many factors, such as differences in investment opportunity sets, risk exposure, risk preferences, and sentiment of the A-share and H-share 7 Beyond the investment flows to H shares via the QDII program, Hong Kong also hosts a group of mainland residents who regularly travel to Hong Kong for business and other purposes and who are able to invest in H shares. investors, might have contributed to this price deviation. Our study focuses on analyzing the differential price reactions of A and H shares to analyst recommendations rather than the differences in their price levels. A-share returns, and 1 firm with Granger causality in both directions. Overall, if we interpret Granger causality as a reflection of the information flow between the two markets, this table shows that information flows symmetrically between the prices of A and H shares. Furthermore, the weaker lead-lag relationship in weekly returns than in daily returns suggests that information flows across the A-share and H-share markets at a frequency mostly faster than weekly.
III. Data Sample of Analyst Recommendations
The segmented pairs of A and H shares offer a unique opportunity to analyze how investors inside and outside mainland China react to public news. We focus on comparing their reactions to analyst recommendations issued by a set of brokerage and research firms, which we simply call houses and which cover both A-share and H-share markets. 9 We collect analyst recommendations issued between January 1, 2007, and October 31, 2014, for the 86 firms with pairs of A and H shares from I/B/E/S and Bloomberg. The initial sample has 38867 recommendations made by 117
houses.
An analyst report typically contains an earnings forecast for the firm, together with a recommendation to investors regarding whether to buy or sell the firm's stocks. As each firm in our sample has both A and H shares, traded by two different sets of investors, it is common for a house to issue a report specifically on one class of shares (say A shares) of a firm, which is targeted to investors of the share class. Such a report may or may not be accompanied by a simultaneous report by the same house on the other share class of the firm. The timing of the reports on the two classes of shares is driven by the needs of the house to serve its clients in the two markets.
By focusing on recommendations issued by houses that cover both A and H shares, we can compare the reactions of A-share and H-share investors to the recommendation changes made by the same house. In other words, when an analyst of a house issues an upgrade to the A-share market and another upgrade to the H-share market, we can compare the price reactions of the two markets.
We will discuss later a variety of factors that may affect the reactions of the two markets. In particular, we are interested in examining whether social connections between the analyst and investors in A-share and H-share markets may cause them to react differently.
9
As the information transmitted by these announcements is firm specific, it has minimal implications for investors' aggregate wealth and consumption. That is, it does not affect the discount rates of A-share and H-share investors. To the extent that A-share and H-share investors face different investment opportunities and market risks, it is possible that they use different discount rates to evaluate the same stock investment and that the difference in their discount rates is an important factor driving the aforementioned large price deviations between the pairs of A and H shares. By comparing price reactions of A and H shares to firm-specific news announcements, we isolate the heterogeneity in the discount rates of A-share and H-share investors from our analysis of the belief revisions induced by the news among the two groups. Furthermore, we ignore the heterogeneity within each of these groups by treating both A-share and H-share investors as homogenous groups.
In addition to the heterogeneity between A-share and H-share investors, we also explore another dimension of heterogeneity between local and foreign analysts. Our analysis builds on a simple notion that A-share investors have closer connections to local analysts than foreign analysts, while H-share investors have closer connections to foreign analysts than local analysts. This notion motivates us to compare A-share (or H-share) price reactions to recommendation changes made by local and foreign analysts and compare price reactions of A and H shares to recommendation changes by local (or foreign) analysts. Furthermore, we will also perform a type of difference-indifference analysis by examining whether the differential price reactions of A shares to recommendation changes by local and foreign analysts are greater than that of H shares.
We count a house as local if its controlling shareholders are Chinese corporations and as foreign otherwise. For most of the analysis, we treat analysts working for local houses as local analysts and those working for foreign houses as foreign analysts. In Section V.D, we will further divide analysts of foreign houses into Chinese and non-Chinese based on their names.
Following the literature, we analyze stock price reaction if there is a change in analyst recommendation issued to a specific share class. The recommendations are reported in five standard categories: strong buy, buy, hold, sell, and strong sell, to which we assign numerical values of 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively. We then calculate recommendation change as the difference of a recommendation relative to the same analyst's previous recommendation within one year. If there is no previous recommendation within one year, we assign the change to be +1 if the current recommendation is strong buy (i.e., recommendation=5), and -1 if the recommendation is sell or strong sell (i.e., recommendation=2, 1). We adopt this asymmetric treatment because analysts tend to give favorable recommendations. In our sample, the average recommendation is 3.85, which is closer to buy than the neutral category of hold.
To focus on recommendation changes issued by houses that cover both A-share and H-share markets, we remove recommendations issued by houses with reports only on A shares or only on H shares. Following Loh and Stulz (2011), we also use several criteria to further screen these recommendations. We delete those recommendations made in the four-day period around firms' quarterly earnings announcements and earnings guidance announcements (one day before to two days after the announcement date) to avoid any contaminating effect caused by these announcements. Finally, we require a valid recommendation to have active trading around its release date in both A and H shares of the firm. After applying these filters, we have a sample with 8113 recommendation changes for 82 firms that were made by analysts from 76 houses. Among another set. Panel B depicts the sample distribution of recommendation changes over time. The balance of recommendation changes made by local and foreign houses is also stable over time.
IV. Theoretical Framework
The segmented pairs of A and H shares allow us to compare the reactions of two groups of investors to recommendation changes made by houses that cover both A-share and H-share markets. The heterogeneity along both the investor side and the analyst side may lead to several effects that jointly determine investor reactions to analyst recommendations. In this section, we present a theoretical framework to illustrate the social connection effect, together with two other effects related to heterogeneous private information between local and foreign investors and heterogeneous information quality between local and foreign analysts. The framework provides three propositions, which serve as the anchors of our empirical analysis.
We first introduce the social connection effect. Several strands of the literature imply that social connections between investors and analysts may affect investors' reactions to analyst recommendations. First, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008, 2009 ) and Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2013) emphasize social trust as an important factor in many economic transactions such as trades between countries, individuals' participation in stock markets, and people's selection of money managers. It is intuitive that there are closer social and cultural connections between local investors and local analysts as they share similar social values and use similar jargon. As a result, local investors may trust local analysts more and thus regard information provided by local analysts as more reliable relative to foreign investors, who tend to have less social and cultural connections to local analysts. Symmetrically, foreign investors may trust foreign analysts more and thus regard information provided by foreign analysts as more reliable.
Second, as a companion effect of social trust, local analysts may also have an advantage relative to foreign analysts in catering to local investors. That is, local analysts may be better at relating their reports to particular concerns and excitement of local investors about a firm. As pointed out by the recent literature on media bias, e.g., Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) , a media firm's reputation for quality is enhanced rather than destroyed when the firm slants its reporting toward the prior beliefs of its customers. The same insight may also work for financial analysts. That is, catering behavior helps breed the trust of local investors in local analysts, and similarly helps breed the trust of foreign investors in foreign analysts.
Finally, limited investor attention may further cause local (foreign) investors to pay more attention to information provided by the more trustworthy local (foreign) analysts, as they are unable to process all publicly available information, e.g., Sims (2003) , Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) , Peng and Xiong (2006) , and Van Nieuwerburg and Veldkamp (2009). As the effects of these three mechanisms-trust, catering, and limited attention-are likely intermingled, we will broadly treat them together as the social connection effect, as stated in the following:
The Social Connection Effect: Local investors regard information provided by local analysts as more reliable than it actually is, while foreign investors regard information by foreign analysts as more reliable than it actually is.
In examining this social connection effect in the data, it is useful to note two other effects that may also cause local and foreign investors to react differently to analyst recommendations. One effect is associated with local investors being better informed than foreign investors about home firms, e.g., Gehrig (1993) and Brennan and Cao (1997) , while the other is related to the argument that the recommendations made by local analysts might be more accurate than those by foreign analysts, e.g., Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) and Du, Yu, and Yu (2014) .
To guide our analysis, we construct a simple learning model to contrast these aforementioned effects in determining the reactions of A-share and H-share investors to analyst recommendations.
We assume that a stock's fundamental value (y) has a normal distribution. For simplicity, we further assume that investors, which may be from A-share or H-share markets, have a diffused prior about , i.e., the variance of their prior belief is infinity.
Suppose that the investors from a particular market, say group ∈ , with denoting Ashare investors and denoting H-share investors, have a piece of private information about :
, where is information noise independent of and with a normal distribution 0, 1/ . is the precision of the private information. If A-share investors are better informed about Chinese firms than H-share investors, then . After observing the private information, the posterior belief of investors in group has a normal distribution with mean and variance 1/ .
Consider an analyst ∈ , , with denoting local analysts and denoting foreign analysts.
The analyst releases a recommendation, which we represent as a piece of public information:
, where is information noise with a normal distribution 0, 1/ ) and is independent of and investors' private information. is the precision of the recommendation. If recommendations of local analysts are more accurate than those of foreign analysts, then .
As we argued before, the social connections between A-share investors and a local analyst The two terms in this expression represent two effects that might cause A-share investors to react more strongly to the recommendation of local analysts than to that of foreign analysts, with the first term arising from the recommendation of local analysts being more precise (i.e., ), and the second term from A-share investors having closer social connections with local analysts (i.e., 0 ). These two effects also affect H-share investors' differential reactions to the recommendations of local and foreign analysts, although in opposite directions:
On one hand, the closer connections of H-share investors to foreign analysts cause them to react more strongly to the recommendation of a foreign analyst, i.e., the second term above being negative. On the other hand, the recommendation of foreign analysts is less precise, which leads the first term to be positive. Consequently, the net effect is not determined. We summarize these discussions as the following proposition: We also compare the reactions of A-share and H-share investors to recommendations by local analysts:
The two terms in this expression also reflect two distinct effects. The first term shows that as Ashare investors have better private information than H-share investors, A-share investors react less strongly. The second term reflects that as A-share investors have closer connections to local analysts, they react more strongly than H-share investors. The net effect of these two forces is not determined. These two forces also affect the differential reactions of A-share and H-share investors to the recommendations by foreign analysts, but along the same direction now:
Thus, H-share investors react more strongly than A-share investors to recommendations by foreign analysts. We summarize these discussions in the following proposition: Propositions I and II show that the social connection effect is entangled with two other effects.
To further isolate the social connection effect, we use a difference-in-difference strategy by taking the difference between (1) and (2):
In fact, taking the difference between (3) and (4) gives the same expression. This additional difference allows us to largely remove the effects of A-share investors having better private information and local analysts having more precise recommendations, even though non-linearity in the reaction coefficients dictates that the removal is incomplete. By taking first-order Taylor approximation around 0 (no social connection effect), we have
Under the presumption that the heterogeneity between A-share and H-share investors and between local and foreign analysts is small, i.e., is small relative to and and is small relative to and , the first term in (5) is proportional to and thus is second order relative to the corresponding first terms in (1)-(4), which are first order. This implies that by taking the additional difference, we can minimize the effects driven by heterogeneity in private information of A-share and H-share investors and heterogeneity in information quality of local and foreign analysts. Consequently, we take the second term as the leading effect, which reflects the social connection effect, as summarized in the following proposition: 
V. Empirical Analysis
In this section, we present empirical results organized around the three propositions outlined in the previous section.
A. Summary Statistics
We use three measures to examine stock price reactions to analyst recommendation changes.
The first one is CAR (-1,1) , the cumulative abnormal return from taking a long position in the recommended share if the recommendation change is favorable and a short position if it is unfavorable from one day before to one day after the recommendation announcement. Note that this measure by design already accounts for whether the recommendation change is upgrade or downgrade. To calculate CAR (-1,1) , we estimate a linear regression of the daily return of each share on the returns of both the Shanghai Composite Index and the Hong Kong Hang Seng Index.
We use data from 365 days to 10 days before each recommendation.
The cumulative abnormal return CAR (-1,1) is the main measure of price reactions in our analysis. We also adopt two other measures for robustness. As some stocks tend to have greater price fluctuations than others, the second measure deflates the cumulative abnormal return, CAR (-1,1) , by the share's idiosyncratic volatility . The idiosyncratic volatility is calculated from the aforementioned market model used to calculate CAR(-1,1). We denote this measure of deflated cumulative abnormal return by dCAR (-1,1) .
The third measure follows Loh and Stulz (2011) . To deal with the large amount of noise in an average analyst recommendation, they propose to analyze influential recommendations that visibly move stock prices. Specifically, they define a recommendation to be influential if it leads to a statistically significant abnormal stock return in the same direction as the recommendation change.
Following their analysis, we define that a recommendation change issued to a particular share class is influential if the share price reacts in the same direction as the recommendation change, i.e., CAR(-1,1)>0, and the absolute value of CAR(-1,1) exceeds √3 1.96, where is the share's idiosyncratic volatility, 3 is the length of the three-day return period, and 1.96 corresponds to the 2.5% significance level of normal distribution. By this definition, we expect 2.5% of the recommendation changes to be influential by pure chance. We can also compare the impact of recommendations made by local analysts on A-share and H-share prices. The reaction of A-share prices is almost the same as that of H-share prices. This lack of differential reactions is actually consistent with Proposition II, which states that despite Ashare investors having closer social connections to local analysts, they may or may not react more strongly than H-share investors to recommendations made by local analysts. This is because Ashare investors also have more private information than H-share investors and thus react less strongly to any public information. In response to recommendations made by foreign analysts, the reaction of A-share prices is 1.0% lower than that of H-share prices. This difference is highly significant and is consistent with Proposition II, which also posits that H-share investors should react more strongly than A-share investors to recommendations made by foreign analysts. This is because H-share investors have not only closer connections to foreign analysts but also less private information relative to A-share investors.
Panel B of Table 2 reports price reactions based on the deflated abnormal return measure dCAR (-1,1) . After the normalization, the overall pattern in the differential reactions of A-share and H-share prices remains virtually identical. The normalization also helps interpret the economic magnitudes of the price reactions. In particular, during the three-day period around the recommendation announcements, the stronger reactions of A-share prices to recommendation changes made by local analysts than those by foreign analysts are on average 22.4% of the idiosyncratic volatility, and H-share prices react more strongly than A-share prices to recommendation changes of foreign analysts on average by 56.3% of the idiosyncratic volatility. All of these fractions are significantly higher than the 2.5% level determined by pure chance. More important, in A-share markets, the fraction of influential recommendation changes by local analysts is significantly higher than that by foreign analysts, while the recommendation changes made by foreign analysts are significantly more influential in H-share markets than in A-share markets.
Panel C of
These differences are both consistent with Propositions I and II.
B. Regression Analysis
To formally compare the differential reactions of A-share and H-share prices, we use several regression specifications to control for a host of other variables that might also affect stock price reactions. Specifically, to examine the differential price reactions of A and H shares to the recommendation changes made by local (or foreign) analysts, we use the following regression specification in the subsample of recommendation changes issued to A (or H) shares:
where , , , is the share price reaction to the recommendation change made by house i to share class m of firm j on date t; is a dummy, which takes the value of 1 if the recommendation is made by a local analyst or 0 otherwise, and , , , represents a host of control variables, which, as we will discuss later, includes the magnitude of the recommendation change. According to Proposition I, we expect the coefficient to be positive in the subsample of recommendation changes issued to A shares, and undetermined in the subsample of recommendation changes issued to H shares. The value of is also a direct measure 11 Loh and Stulz (2011) analyze a sample of analyst recommendations for U.S. stocks in the I/B/E/S database and find the fraction of influential recommendation changes to be around 11%, slightly higher than the fractions in our sample. of the differential price reactions of the market to recommendation changes made by local and foreign analysts.
To examine the differential price reactions between A and H shares to recommendation changes made by local (or foreign) analysts, we use the following regression specification in the subsample of recommendation changes made by local (or foreign) analysts:
whereis a dummy, which takes a value of 1 if the recommendation is issued to A shares or 0 otherwise. According to Proposition II, we expect the coefficient to be negative in the subsample of recommendation changes made by foreign analysts, and undetermined in the subsample of recommendation changes made by local analysts. The value of from this regression is a direct measure of the differential price reactions of A and H shares to the sample of recommendations.
As shown by our theoretical framework, the price reactions estimated from regressions (6) and (7) contain not only the social connection effect but also two other effects related to heterogeneous information of A-share and H-share investors and heterogeneous information quality of local and foreign analysts. To isolate the social connection effect, we examine the following difference-in-difference regression motivated by Proposition III in the full sample of recommendation changes made by both local and foreign analysts to both A and H shares:
Proposition III suggests that the coefficient of the key interaction term - * is positive, as its value measures how much the differential reactions of A-share investors to recommendations made by local and foreign analysts are greater than the differential reactions of H-share investors.
In estimating each of the regressions specified in (6), (7), and (8) We use three variables to characterize recommendation changes. First, the magnitude of recommendation change, Drecomm, is simply the absolute value of a recommendation change.
The average change is 1.243 for the A-share sample, while it is 1.496 for the H-share sample. We also include two dummies Prev_own and Prev_other to measure whether there were other recommendations issued by the same brokerage house during the prior week for the same share class and the other class of the firm, respectively. If a house had recently issued a recommendation for the same firm, the prior recommendation may have partially leaked the information in the current recommendation to the public. Including these dummies helps to control for these nuanced effects. In the data, the frequency of having another recommendation in the prior week by the same house for either share class of the same firm is less than 5% in both A-share and H-share samples.
We use two brokerage house characteristics to capture each house's ability. We measure a house's experience, Experience, by the number of quarters the house has been covering a firm, which has an average value of 19.881 in the A-share sample and 23.843 in the H-share sample.
We follow Hong and Kubik (2003) to use a ranking method to measure the accuracy of a house's previous earnings forecasts. Specifically, we collect all EPS forecasts from IBES and Bloomberg, compute each house's EPS forecasting errors by the absolute forecast error divided by the firm's share price at the end of the previous year, sort errors of all observations into 5 quintiles, and use a house's quintile in the previous year as the measure. This variable, Accrank, has an average value of 3.031 in the A-share sample and 3.182 in the H-share sample.
We use several firm characteristics to capture uncertainty faced by investors regarding a firm's shares. We include size and analyst coverage as investors face a more opaque information environment for small firms and firms with less analyst coverage. As the two share classes are segmented, we separately measure the size of each share class, Size, by a logarithm of the market value of all floating shares in the class at the end of the previous year. Size has an average value of 24.201 in the A-share sample and 23.977 in the H-share sample. We measure analyst coverage, NCover, by the number of analysts that cover a given share class of a firm in a given year. This variable has an average value of 12.348 in the A-share sample and 22.319 in the H-share sample.
We also include the fraction of floating shares held by institutional investors, Institutional, as a control variable as institutional investors usually subscribe to Bloomberg and other news portals and have better access to analyst reports than retail investors. This fraction has an average value of 19.4% in the A-share sample, which is lower than the average value of 35.6% in the H-share sample, consistent with the fact that there are more institutional investors in the Hong Kong stock market. We also include Hfraction, the ratio of floating H shares to the total number of floating A and H shares across all the two share classes. This variable has an average value of around 0.4 in both A-share and H-share samples.
We also include several market variables, such as turnover rate Turnover, idiosyncratic return volatility Idiov, and return momentum Momentum. These variables serve to control for the timing of analyst recommendations, i.e., analysts releasing recommendations during periods of high volatility and high sentiment in A-share and H-share markets. We measure Turnover and
Momentum by their average values in the prior three months and Idiov by the aforementioned market model with data in the prior year. We also include the price ratio of A to H shares, AHprcratio, as it may contain information for future price movements. This ratio has an average value of 1.421 in the A-share sample and 1.424 in the H-share sample. The difference in these values is due to the different times when the two samples of recommendations were made. Table 4 reports the OLS regression results from using CAR(-1,1) as the dependent variable to separately estimate regressions (6), (7), and (8). Note that if we do not include any control variables, the univariate analysis of these regressions will lead to the summary statistics reported in Table 2 .
The first and second major columns report results from estimating regression (6) in the samples of recommendation changes issued to A and H shares, respectively. In the first major column for the A-share sample, the coefficient of the key dummy variable LocalAnalyst has a positive estimate of 0.4% with a t-statistic of 2.26, 12 which confirms that A-share investors react more strongly to recommendations by local analysts, as stated by Proposition I. In the second major column for the H-share sample, the coefficient of LocalAnalyst has a negative estimate of -0.6% with a t-statistic of -4.09. This coefficient suggests that H-share investors react more strongly to recommendations by foreign analysts, despite the countervailing effect of foreign analysts potentially having lower information quality than local analysts.
Among the control variables, the coefficient of absolute recommendation change magnitude The third and fourth major columns of Table 4 report results from estimating regression (7) in the samples of recommendation changes made by local and foreign analysts, respectively. In the local-analyst sample (the third column), the coefficient of the key dummy variable A-Share has a positive estimate of 0.7% with a t-statistic of 2.43, while in the foreign-analyst sample (the
12
Due to the availability of several control variables, the number of observations is reduced to 2098 from 2347, i.e., 1475 recommendation changes by local analysts and 872 by foreign analysts, as reported in Table 2. fourth column), the coefficient of A-Share has a negative estimate of -0.7% with a t-statistic of 3.21. This asymmetric pattern is consistent with Proposition II, which states that H-share investors react more strongly than A-share investors to recommendations made by foreign analysts, although A-share investors may or may not react more strongly than H-share investors to recommendations by local analysts. The coefficients of control variables are similar to those in the first and second columns.
The fifth major column of Table 4 (6), and heterogeneous information quality of local and foreign analysts, which interferes with the results from the estimation of regression (7). Thus, the result from estimating regression (8) indicates the presence of the social connection effect in driving the reactions of A-share and H-share investors to analyst recommendations.
13
We also use the two alternative price reaction measures, dCAR (-1,1) and Inf, as the dependent variable to re-run regressions (6), (7), and (8). Tables 5 and 6 report the respective results, which are consistent with those reported in Table 4 . In both tables, the coefficient estimate of the key term from estimating regression (6) is significantly positive in the A-share sample (major column 1), the coefficient offrom estimating regression (7) is significantly negative in the foreign-analyst sample (major column 4), and the coefficient of the interaction term 13 There is a ten-percent daily stock price change limit in the A-share market but not in the H-share market. In our sample, only 46 out of the 8113 recommendation changes reached the daily price change limit during the three-day window around the announcement date. Removing these observations gives virtually the same results.
- * from estimating regression (8) is significantly positive in the full sample (major column 5).
Taken together, by using three different measures of stock price reactions, we find a rich set of differential investor reactions to analyst recommendations. The patterns of these differential reactions are consistent with the predictions outlined in Propositions I-III. In particular, the findings support the presence of social connection effect in driving the differential reactions of local and foreign investors to recommendations made by local and foreign analysts. In the next two subsections, we take advantage two special subsamples of the data to further demonstrate the robustness of this key result.
C. The Paired Subsample
In our sample, there are 296 pairs of recommendation changes that are made by the same brokerage house for the same firm on the same date, with one for the firm's A shares and the other for its H shares. To take advantage of these paired recommendation changes, we can use a difference-in-difference approach to control for all firm specific characteristics and analyst specific characteristics, which may not be fully captured by the control variables used in our earlier regressions.
Specifically, we first measure the differential price reaction between A and H shares to each of these paired recommendation changes, then run the following regression:
where _ , , is the differential price reaction between the A and H-share to the recommendation change pair made by house i for the two classes of shares of firm j on date t; is a dummy, which takes the value of 1 if the recommendation is made by a local analyst and 0 otherwise. According to Proposition III, the differential reactions of A-share and Hshare investors to recommendations made by local analysts are greater than their differential reactions to recommendations by foreign analysts. Thus, we expect to be positive. Like before, we use the three measures of price reactions to compute the differential reactions of A and H shares as the dependent variable. The control variables include all of those used in regressions (6)-(8).
For any variable with different values for A and H shares, such as idiosyncratic volatility and turnover, we include its values for both share classes in the regression. As before, we cluster errors on announcement dates and firm/house pairs in calculating the t-statistics. Table 7 reports the regression results. The first major column uses the difference of CAR (-1,1) between A and H shares as the dependent variable. The coefficient estimate of the key variable has a large positive value of 1.6% with a t-statistic of 3.24, despite that the small sample size makes many of the control variables insignificant. The second major column uses the difference of dCAR (-1,1) as the dependent variable and gives almost the same result, with the coefficient of being positive and highly significant. The third major column uses the difference of Inf between A and H shares as the dependent variable. In this regression, the coefficient of is positive but insignificant. The small sample size makes it rather difficult to show any statistical significance in the properties of influential recommendation changes, which are just about 6% of this already small sample.
Taken together, Table 7 shows that even after using a small sample of paired recommendation changes to control for all unobservable firm and analyst characteristics, there is still significant evidence supporting the key prediction of Proposition III that the differential reactions of A-share and H-share investors to recommendations made by local analysts are greater than their differential reactions to recommendations by foreign analysts.
D. Chinese versus Non-Chinese Analysts of Foreign Houses
In our earlier analysis, we treat analysts working for local houses as local analysts and for foreign houses as foreign analysts. In this subsection, we further explore the heterogeneity within analysts of foreign houses. It is common for foreign brokerage houses to hire both Chinese and non-Chinese analysts to cover Chinese firms, although it is rare for local houses to hire non- This difference-in-difference analysis allows us to control for an argument about A-share and H-share investors having differential access to reports of local and foreign houses. That is, due to language and cultural reasons, it may be easier for A-share investors to access reports and contact analysts of local houses and for H-share investors to obtain reports and contact analysts of foreign houses. As investors (A-share or H-share investors) have the same access to reports by Chinese and non-Chinese analysts of the same foreign houses, comparing price reactions of A and H shares to these reports naturally controls for this accessibility issue.
We use the analyst's name to identify whether an analyst is Chinese. Bloomberg provides the full name of the analyst for each analyst report, and I/B/E/S provides the analyst's last name together with the initial of the first name for each analyst report. We define an analyst as Chinese if her full name is based on Pinyin, the official phonetic system for transcribing the sound of Chinese characters into Latin script, and as foreign if her name is not based on Pinyin.
Note that A-share investors are primarily residents of mainland China, while H-share investors are comprised of residents from outside mainland China, including Chinese speaking regions such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and other parts of the world such as the U.S., the U.K., and continental Europe. It is thus useful to separate analysts with origins inside mainland China from those with origins in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore even though they can also speak Chinese.
To do so, we take advantage of the fact that the Pinyin systems used in mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore are different from each other. Specifically, by potentially abusing the term "Chinese," we define an analyst as Chinese only if her full name matches Pinyin used in mainland China. It is easy for both local and foreign investors to recognize an analyst whose name matches this criterion as coming from a family in mainland China.
We adopt a regression specification similar to (8):
where , , , is the share price reaction to the recommendation change made by analyst i for firm j in market m on date t, is a dummy variable indicating whether a recommendation change is made by a Chinese analyst of a foreign house.
We focus on a subsample of analyst recommendations made by foreign houses that have both
Chinese and non-Chinese analysts. Because some foreign houses have only non-Chinese analysts and analyst names are missing from some analyst reports, the sample size drops to 741 recommendation changes made by non-Chinese analysts of foreign houses and 376 recommendation changes by Chinese analysts. 
VI. Conclusion
This paper uses the segmented dual-class shares of Chinese firms to analyze the differential reactions of local and foreign investors to analyst recommendations. We find a rich set of differential reactions. These findings cannot be fully explained by local investors being more informed than foreign investors about local firms or local analysts having better information quality than foreign analysts. Instead, it supports the notion that social connections between investors and analysts can cause differential investor reactions to analyst recommendations. (-1,1) , the cumulative abnormal return of a position based on the recommendation change from one day before to one day after the recommendation announcement. A-Share = 1 if the recommendation is for A shares. LocalAnalyst = 1 if the recommendation is made by local analysts. Other control variables are the same as those reported in Table 3 . We cluster errors on announcement dates and firm/house pairs, and use *, **, and *** to denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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